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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





 Pro se appellant Gilberto Ramos appeals the District Court’s order denying his 
motion for compassionate release.  The Government has filed a motion for summary 
affirmance.  For the reasons discussed below, we grant the Government’s motion and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In 2016, Ramos was convicted of four counts involving the possession or 
distribution of methamphetamine and sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment.  Ramos 
appealed the criminal judgment but then voluntarily withdrew his appeal.  See C.A. No. 
16-1167.   
 In May 2020, Ramos filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  See ECF No. 85.  He argued that the District Court should release 
him because his asthma places him at an increased danger from the COVID-19 pandemic, 
he has changed his life for the better while in prison, and he wishes to help care for his 
son.  The District Court denied the motion, concluding both that Ramos had not shown 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” in sentence, 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors counseled against release.  
See ECF No. 91.  Ramos filed a notice of appeal, and the Government has moved for 
summary affirmance.   
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 




2020).  We may summarily affirm if “no substantial question is presented” by the appeal.  
3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4.    
 We will grant the Government’s motion.  The compassionate-release provision 
states that a district court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of 
probation or supervised release” if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warrant such a reduction.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Before granting compassionate 
release, a district court must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the 
extent that they are applicable.”  § 3582(c)(1)(A).  Those factors include, among other 
things, “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the 
offense”; “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public 
from further crimes of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
 We discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that a number 
of the § 3553(a) factors weighed against granting compassionate release here.1  As the 
Court explained, Ramos has a lengthy criminal history—he had been convicted seven 
times before the methamphetamine offenses that led to his current incarceration—which 
includes several violent offenses.  See ECF No. 91 at 10 (noting that “[t]he facts 
underlying his simple assault convictions, as well as his theft conviction, are particularly 
 
1 Based on this conclusion, we need not address whether “extraordinary and compelling 




violent and disturbing”).  The District Court thus did not err in finding that “Ramos 
presents a danger to the community if released.”  Id.  Nor can we say that the Court erred 
in treating Ramos’s methamphetamine offenses as serious and militating against early 
release.  Finally, it was reasonable for the District Court to conclude that the fact that 
Ramos still had about five-and-a-half years2 of his sentence remaining worked against 
him.  See, e.g., Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330.  We therefore do not have “a definite and 
firm conviction that [the District Court] committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”  Id. (alteration omitted) 
(quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000)).    
Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion3 and will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  
 
2 Ramos argues that the District Court should have considered not the amount of time 
remaining on the sentence as initially imposed by the District Court, but on the time until 
he might be eligible to be admitted to a halfway house.  Br. at 6.  In Pawlowski, we 
focused on the time remaining on the total sentence, explaining that “[b]ecause a 
defendant’s sentence reflects the sentencing judge’s view of the § 3553(a) factors at the 
time of sentencing, the time remaining in that sentence may . . . inform whether 
immediate release would be consistent with those factors.”  967 F.3d at 331.  In any 
event, even using the alternative dates that Ramos proposes, we would not find that the 
District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion. 
3 In its motion for summary action, the Government also sought permission to be relieved 
of its obligation to file a brief; that request is granted.   
